Chilcott Iraq Inquiry - New Evidence From Chris Ames

by Chris Ames

Once again I have obtained via the Freedom of Information Act a significant document that the Inquiry has failed to publish. Once again, a witness is shown to have misled the Inquiry. No-one should expect that the Inquiry will notice.

As Richard Norton-Taylor and I reveal in the Guardian, A newly disclosed memo shows that in the days before Tony Blair met George Bush at Camp David in September 2002, the Foreign Office was planning for the possibility that Britain might take military action against Iraq without “taking the UN Route”.

The disclosure contradicts evidence given by Lord Jay in June to the Inquiry. Jay was formerly permanent under secretary at the Foreign Office and the FCO’s most senior civil servant. At the Inquiry, he was asked whether it was “ever a possibility” that Britain might “go to the use of force without the UN Resolution”. He answered: “No.”

Here Jay does not even have the defence of claiming that he was only exploring possibilities, given that he stated directly that the possibility never existed. According to the September 2002 memo from John Williams, press secretary to Jack Straw, Jay asked him to “produce a media strategy to cover all circumstances”. These circumstances were “taking the UN route” and “not taking the UN route”.

The evidence is stacking up that before UNSCR 1441 was negotiated – and in this case before the September 2002 Camp David summit and George W Bush’s commitment to seek UN cover – the British government was prepared to go to war in circumstances that attorney general Lord Goldsmith had clearly said would be illegal.

When Williams’ first draft of the Iraq dossier was forced into the open (by my FOI) in February 2008, he mentioned the memo that has just been disclosed. He did indeed say that the burden of proof should be placed on Iraq. But although Williams claimed two years ago that “within the British government, especially in the Foreign Office, we still thought Saddam might be dealt with through the UN”, in 2002 he was very willing to “put with vigour” the case for war “not taking the UN route”.

He ends his memo on an optimistic note: “the argument is there to be won but not if we let the media dictate terms.” He notes that following Blair’s press conference on the dossier, “Sky’s poll now running shows 48% favour military action, with 52% against”.

The memo does not explicitly state what policy the strategy is intended to promote but it is implicit that the aim is to justify military action against Iraq, with or without UN backing.

Williams comments that the dossier as it existed at the time has “no ‘killer fact’ which ‘proves’ that Saddam must be taken on now, or this or that weapon will be used against us”. He advised that “an uncertain public will be repelled by excessive certainty”.

In spite of this, when launching the dossier three weeks later, Tony Blair told parliament that intelligence had “established beyond doubt” that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

In terms that are very reminiscent of Williams’ draft dossier, the strategy advises that “we need to fix one image of brutality in the public mind”.

The Inquiry disclosed on Wednesday that Williams has been asked to provide written evidence. It is clear that Williams’ role is going to come under a lot more scrutiny than at the Hutton Inquiry.

But what about Jay? Here is the key exhange from June:

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: I would like to turn to the negotiations at the UN on what became UNSCR 1441 and the subsequent attempt earlier in 2003 to agree to a second resolution.
Sir Jeremy Greenstock told us that he had advised you in October 2002 that he might have to consider his position if it became UK policy to go along with abandoning the UN route and to go to the use of force without the UN Resolution. Was that ever a possibility in UK policy?
RT HON THE LORD JAY: No. I mean, I saw Sir Jeremy said that. I remember Jeremy ringing me. I don’t remember him saying that because — it wasn’t a conceivable possibility, as I recollect it.

In July last year, Sir John Chilcot said this:

“If someone were foolish or wicked enough to tell a serious untruth in front of the inquiry like that, their reputation would be destroyed utterly and forever. It won’t happen.”

Last November, he said that the fact that “the stuff is there on paper anyway” would deter people from dissembling.

This July, Chilcot said this:

“Over the coming months, we will be analysing and integrating all this evidence and information as we begin to write our report. As we do this, we may find conflicts or gaps within the evidence. If we do, we will need to consider how best to get to the bottom of what actually happened. This may be through seeking additional written evidence or- where we wish to probe more deeply- through holding further hearings possibly recalling witnesses from whom we have heard before.”

I have no doubt that John Williams’ media strategy has been given to the Inquiry. But Jay has not, apparently, been asked to clarify his evidence, let alone exposed – by the Inquiry – as a liar.